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THE POSTWAR ECONOMIC HISTORY OF JAPAN* 
Hugh Patrick 
This essay treats Japan's economic history for the almost three 
decades following the restoration of independence in spring 1952. Japan's 
postwar economy is based on the competitive market, private enterprise 
~ystem. Most businesses are privately owned, workers find jobs and are 
hired on a private, voluntary basis, and (mainly) private demand for 
goods and services determines what will be produced and at what prices. 
·The government's main role in the economy is indirect: to set the rules, 
to help shape incentives for producers and workers, and to influence the 
general environment within which the economy operates. 
Despite problems and difficul~ies, the basic theme for this period 
is one of outstanding success. The rapidity and duration of economic 
growth has been unprecedented, transforming the fragile economy of the 
early 1950s, with productivity and standard of living at developing 
nation levels, into an immense industrial, urban, affluent society com­
parable to Western Europe and the United States. The benefits of this 
process have been widely diffused among the people. 
Following sections provide an overview of Japan's economic perfor­
mance including the sources of growth, trace attendant changes in the 
economic structure, and consider the evolution of domestic and inter­
national economic environment. The final section appraises the benefits 
and costs of this economic performance, noting problems remaining. 
* To appear-in shortened form in Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo:
Kodansha, forthcoming), hence the lack of footnotes and specific citations. 
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I. Economic Heritage 
The most fundamental economic fact is that Japan is and has long 
been a populous island nation subsisting in a relatively small geographic 
area of which only about 15 percent is arable, and with limited amounts 
of mineral resources most of which have been used up over the past cen­
tury. In 1952 Japan's population was 85.5 million. The nation's size was 
377,420 square kilometers, two-thirds that of France, but about half 
again as large as the United Kingdom-or West Germany. The implication 
is that, even more than for most nations, Japan's economic progress must be 
founded on industrialization. Its economic destiny is as a processing 
nation, importing fuels, minerals, foodstuffs and other land products 
to sup?ort domestic production and consumption, and exporting manufactured 
goods to.pay for these essential imports. 
No economy operates in a historicnl vacuum. While Japan in 1952 had 
a measured gross national product (G~~P) per capita of only $188, below 
that of such less developed countries as Brazil, Chile and Malaysia, its 
accumulated economic heritage made its growth potential unusually 
high. Since opening in 1868 the country had built itself into a major 
industrial nation, with the attendant creation of economic institutions 
and a mass educational system. 
World War II was disastrous: 2.8 million dead, cities devastated, 
an empire lost, some two-fifths of the nation's capital stock of buildings 
and machinery destroyed. It was to take Japan some seventeen years to 
restore prewar standards of living and levels of productivity. It would 
take longer to eliminate many of the economic controls instituted during 
Postwar Economic History - 3 
wartime, especially in financial and international trade sectors. Yet 
war production also developed the skills of workers, engineers, managers, 
and economic planners. 
The postwar Allied Occupation wrought profound institutional 
and attitudinal changes in economic as well as other spheres, changes 
which provided a more equal balance of power among workers, farmers, 
managers, and owners of capitaL 
The immediate needs for reconstruction and recovery gave a focus to govern­
ment policy and private behavior of high priority to economic goals, 
domestically and internationally; the efforts to increase output necessi­
tated sacrifices perhaps more easily acquiesced to in a defeated society. 
The Korean War was a substantial economic boon to Japan. Through· Ameri­
can special procurement and the general expansion of world trade Japan 
was enabled to earn the foreign exchange to pay for the imports so 
essential for economic recovery and growth. 
Like other low-income countries Japan in the early 1950s had higha 
proportion of its labor force (more than two-fifths) in agriculture, 
additional numbers in relatively inefficient small-scale industrial and 
service enterprises, a small capital stock (machinery, buildings and other 
facilities) per worker, technological levels that in most industries lagged 
far behind the West, and as a consequence low labor productivity. Postwar 
Japan als::>inherited a highly educated and skilled labor force, with 
formal educational levels comparable to England and above those elsewhere 
in Europe. The widespread dualism in labor use between small, low­
productivity agriculture and family businesses and large, modern in­
dustrial firms offered a potential for productivity enhancement 
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by shifting workers. Japan also had substantial entrepreneurial, 
managerial, organizational, scientific and enp,ineering skills capable 
of rapidly absorbing and adapting the best foreign technology and 
developing domestic technologies, and engaging in innovative 
commercial application. What Japan needed was the capital, access 
to foreign technology, and a suitable domestic and international envir­
onment for e~onomic growth. And these were forthcoming during the next 
two decades--in large part due to the assiduous efforts of the J~panese 
themselves. 
II. Economic Performance: An Overview 
'. The usual criteria for evaluation of an economy I s performance, over 
time and in comparison with others, include maintenance of price stabil­
ity and full employr.1cnt, minimization of cyclical instability and 
especially recessions, achievement of desired rates of GNP growth, and 
the improvement in the people's welfare, including the equitable 
distribution of income, wealth, consumption and other economic benefits 
as well as their costs of achievement. At times these goals are in 
conflict. A remarkable feature is that by virtually all criteria 
Japan's postwar economy has performed extremely well; as discussed 
below the main areas of poor performance have lain in environ-
mental pollution and degradation, and to some degree in the control of 
inflation. Though complex interactions have been at work, sustained rapid 
economic growth has brought about successful achievement of other goals. It has 
resulted in (as well as being caused by) full employment, only minor 
and temporary recessions, and a rapidly rising standard of living for 
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virtually all Japanese. 
Aggregative dimensions of this performance are summarized in Figure 
1 and Table 1. The GNP growth rate averaged 8.4 percent from 1952 
through 1978 despite the 1974-75 re~ession. The economy's size thus 
increased by about 72 
1 times, doubling every~ 1 years. The economy was 
subject to cyclical instability but around such a high growth trend 
that jn only the year of the world's most serious postwar recession, 
1974, di<l output actually decrease and then only trivially. The annual 
rise in consumer prices was generally kept under six percent until the 
outburst of world inflation in 1973; by 1978 Japan had inflation well 
under control, at rates substantially lower than the United States or 
West Europe. 
Japan's record of full employment has also been remarkable, es­
pecially in comparison with the United States. Differences in statistical 
definitions and weasurements account for only an insignificant share of 
the explanation. A variety of forces have been at work to maintain full 
employ~cnt. Japan's hiring system gives preference to young new entrants 
into the labor force; in its homogeneous society there are virtually 
no unemployed young people seeking work. Overtime is standard; in per­
iods of decreased demand hours are reduced. The permanent employment 
system, combined with fairly optimistic projections by firms for future 
labor needs as well as union preference for job security over wage 
increases in periods of adversity, has meant occasional, temporary 
periods of excess workers on company payrolls, notably in large 
firms. The still large number of family-ovmed farms and small busi-
nesses provide a residual source of employment. Employment reduction 
in the one serious recession, 1974-75, occurred mainly among middle-
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aged married women and older persons; they simply dropped out of the labor 
force rather than seeking employment or listing themselves as unemployed. 
Japan's postwar quarter-century of exceptionally rapid growth was 
without historical precedent: never had any economy grown so rapidly for 
so long, especially in per capita terms. The more recent sustained 
rapid growth of a number of economies--Brazil, Romania, South Korea, 
Taiwan, among others--suggests the Japanese experience,rather than 
unique, is one form of the global spread of the industrial 
revolution begun two centuries ago. Japan was classified as a less 
developed country until the early 1960s; by the late 1950s it 
was the second largest borrower from the World Bank. With its accession 
to membership in OECD in 1964 Japan was recognized as one of the advanced 
industrial nations. By 1968 with its substantially larger population 
Japan surpassed West Germany to become the world's third largest economy; 
by 1973 it passed the United Kingdom in GNP per capita. As Table l 
above and Table 4 later indicate in tenns of output, income and socio­
economic indicators of welfare Japan is among the half-dozen leading 
economies of the world. By the end of the 1970s Japan's economy was 
vastly stronger and both qualitatively and quantitatively different 
from the early 1950s. 
Sources of Economic Growth 
Efforts to understand the nature and mechanisms bringing about 
Japan's very rapid overall growth have resulted in numerous 
studies of varying degrees of sophistication. They range 
from lengthy lists of causes without explanation of their relative 
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importance, to highly technical measures of the relative contribu-
tions of the domestic supplies of the main economic factors of produc­
tion, namely labor (of varying education, skill and other attributes), 
physical capital (inventories, machinery, buildings, other facilities 
categorized by age, type, and ownership), and natural resources (agricul­
tural and other land, mineral deposits, aquatic resources and the like). 
The synergistic interrelationships among various causal forces are 
important but difficult to understand well enough to estimate with any 
precision. These standard economic factors are considered first; in 
a later section important features of the general economic environment 
are discussed. 
One well developed methodology is to estimate the direct contribution 
to increases in the economy's production due separately to the increases 
in the inputs of labor, capital, and natural resources, using simplify­
ing assumptions which exclude interaction effects among these inputs. 
Since the amount of natural resources has changed very little, analyses 
have concentrat~d on specifying in differing degrees of detail the inputs 
of labor and capital. This approach makes possible rather precise 
.quantitative estimates of the sources of growth by each input for Japan 
and in comparison with other industrial countries. Major examples 
are the studies by Denison and Chung, Christensen, Cummings and 
Jorgenson, and Jorgenson and Nishimizu cited in the bibliography. 
Despite certain technical and methodological differences, several 
general conclusions obtain from these and other studies. First, no 
single cause predominates in explaining Japan's rapid growth; both labor 
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and capital inputs grew substantially, and the general environment in­
cluding government policy was highly supportive. 
Second, the growth of GNP has been more rapid than the weighted 
average of all the measured increas~s in productive inputs. These in­
puts explain between 60-75 percent of output growth, but the remaining 
25-40 percent cannot be attributed directly to the increases in labor 
and capital used. This residual is broadly ascribed. to technological 
progress, improvements in economic efficiency. These include a host 
of factors, such as: new hardware and software technologies derived 
from basic and applied sciences; improvements in machinery not 
adequately estimated in measures of capital; better organizational 
and managerial methods; adaptive and improvement engineering in the 
production process; and such interaction effects as the ability of 
better-trained workers to obtain better results from the machinery 
they use, and the impact of new machineries and methods of production 
in enhancing the skills of workers. 
Third, the growth of the physical capital stock--including machinery, 
buildings, inventories, roads, and other infrastructure used in the 
production process,--has been extremely rapid, increasing at some 12-15 
percent annually on average. Accordingly, the capital contribution to 
growth has been larger than in other countries, and greater than labor's 
contribution. 
Fourth, the growth of labor input has nonetheless been significant, 
since each unit of labor contributes more to output than capital. 
Total adjusted labor input increased at about 22 
1 
percent annually. 
This labor contribution has consisted of a variety of elements. 
The most important has been the rise in employment itself, somewhat 
above one percent a year, reflecting population growth, changing age 
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distribution, and changing labor force participation rates. In addition 
the average number of hours worked per week increased despite the reduc­
tion in the work week for full-time workers due to the decline in part­
time workers. The increasing educat.ion and work experience of the 
typical worker enhanced labor's contribution to output. 
Investment and Saving 
It is important to go behind these facts of capital and labor 
growth and technological change to comprehend the more basic forces 
at work. Consider, for example, the investment which brought about 
the increase in the capital stock. The predominant share of invest­
ment has been by private businesses for productive purposes and by 
individuals for housing; the gove1.-ument share was modest though 
nonetheless important in providing substantial transportation, com­
munications, education, and other facilities necessary for private 
business success. Gross fixed investment, public and private, about 
20 percent of GNP in the early 1950s, rose to a peak of 37 percent 
in 1973 before receding to 31-33 percent in the late 1970s. This 
was unprecedented in a peacetime, democratic market economy; no 
previous economy had voluntarily plowed back such a high share of 
current production into future growth. 
Fueling this process was a private business investment boom 
that lasted for two decades until the 1973 oil crisis. Business 
entrepreneurial leadership and vision, and their increasingly 
optimistic expectations, were the key. They were founded on good 
reasons. With relative low labor costs, tremendous opportunities 
to innovate in new products and production methods through utilization 
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of foreign and domestic technology, and burgeoning domestic and foreign 
markets, expansion of production and requisite production facilities 
was not only highly profitable but virtually essential to stay abreast 
of one's competitors. 
Investment required more than businass decisions and domestic 
and foreign facilities to produce the investment equipment; it had to 
be matched by saving, and by effective mechanisms for transferring these 
funds from savers to investors. A significant feature of Japan's growth 
process is that domestic saving rose along with investment; reliance 
on foreign borrowing, while important for a.few large firms, was 
inconsequential for the economy as a whole. Business investment was 
fin~nced in part from retained profits and increasing amounts of 
depreciation reserves generated by earlier investment. However, 
business funding needs far exceeded internally generated sources. 
External sources of funds, in part by issuing stocks and bonds, but 
mainly by borrowing from banks were the solution. The financial system 
responded effectively to this business demand for loans. But financial 
institutions had to have funds to lend; these came from the deposits 
of individual savers who preferred the safety of banks to other types 
of financial assets. 
The most unusual aspect of Japan's postwar saving performance has 
been the sharply rising and now very high rate of family personal 
saving from disposible income. In 1952-54 personal sector saving 
was six percent of GNP and 25 percent of gross domestic saving; in 
1974-76 it equalled 18 percent of GNP and 55 percent of gross 
saving. The personal sector heteror,eneously includes professionals, 
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unincorporated businessmen and farmers in addition to wage earners, 
each with sol"lewhat different savings behavior. Japanese house-
holds have increased their saving rate out of disposable income from 
present United States levels (about 7 percent) in the 1950s to about 
23 percent in the 1970s, substantially above other major nations. The 
causes of such saving behavior are yet to be fully understood. A 
nmr,ber of institutional factors at work include: the high cost of land 
aac.1 housing Ov.'n.ership coupled with underdeveloped mortgage markets; 
target saving for children's Education, marriages, consumer durables, 
and unanticipated adversities; and an early age of retirement, expanded 
longevity, and modest retirement benefits. 
Japan differed in the early 1950s from developing countries in that 
it h.::i.d achieved industrial nation demographic patterns of low birth, 
de3th, and population growth rates. Despite an average annual growth 
rate between 1952 and 1978 of population of only 1.1 percent, and 
laLor force of 1.5 percent, until the early 1960s Japan remained a 
country of very abundant labor in low productivity uses, readily avail­
able to move into higher productivity, higher paying, industrial jobs. 
(The sectoral changes in labor force distribution are given in Table 3 , ) 
The reallocation of workers among sectors, especially from agriculture, 
among occupations, and among regions of the country, has been profound. 
To a considerablc·degree this mobility has been inter-generational, as 
young new workers respond to new opportunities. As already noted, 
Japan's labor force was already highly educated at the beginning of 
the period; by the late 1970s nine,tenths of the young generation 
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complete senior high school, and about 40 percent continue on for higher 
education. Japan's labor force is appropriately characterized as hard­
working, diligent, intelligent, well trained, and well motivated. While 
wage rates and labor costs were low in the 1950s, in the late 1970s that 
is no longer so; both are close to American and European levels. 
Technology 
The increase in labor productivity (output per worker per year) aver­
aging about seven percent annually was due not only to these improvements 
in labor quality and utilization, and increasing amowtts of machinery 
and ether capital with which to work, but also to a host of techno-
logical and organizational i~provements that made workers more efficient. 
These improvements have resulted from effective business and government 
research and development policies. They combined methods for search-
ing for the best known foreign technologies and an increasingly strong 
domest.ic rese;:irch p_ffort to ::in::ipt, improve ann m::ik<> <>l"nnnmi,..,,lly 
competitive imported technology and to develop new domestic products 
and production processes. Since Japanese firms had requisite managerial, 
scientific and engineering skills most foreign technology not already 
in the public domain was purchased through patent and license agree­
ments with American and European firms. Thousands of contracts were 
signed; this period records the largest and most comprehensive 
transfer of industrial technology into one country that has ever occurred. 
The focus was on commercially feasible technologies, rather than for 
military, space exploration, or other less directly economic purposes. 
Private industry accordingly has played the major role in the nation's 
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research effort, considerably more so in Japan than elsewhere. Over the 
years research and development expenditures have increased substantially 
in absolute amOlmt, with the share in GNP rising from 1. 3 percent in 1962 
to 1. 7 percent in 1976. 
As a consequence, Japan has sharply reduced its technological gap 
with the West on average, and some industries are ahead of the United 
States. Estimates by Jorgenson and Nishimizu 
suggest such a rapid improvement in Japanese technology that by the mid-
1970s Japan's average technological level was equal to or surpassine 
the United States, implying that remaining lower Japanese worker pro­
ductivity is the consequence only of less capital per worker and a far 
poorer natural resource base. However, the facts that the technological 
level of firms apparently differs more widely by firm size in Japan, and 
that such studies inevitably require simplifications in methodology and 
data, suggest the desirability of some skepticism on specific compari­
sons while accepting the general point of sharply narrowing technological 
differences. 
III. Changes in Economic Structure 
_Rapid growth was intertwined with profound transformations of the 
economy in major dimensions, including the general categories in which 
GNP 'l!as used, the sectoral composition of production, the location of 
economic activity and people, and the distribution of production 
between small firms and large. 
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Table 2 provides evidence on the overall shifts in the way in 
which GNP was used. The investment boom, increasing its share in the 
GNP pie, meant inevitably that the share of private consumption would 
decrease, even though over the period total consumption grew rapidly. 
Unlike most industrial countries, the government sector share--in 
provision of services and in publi_c investment activities-- rose scarcely 
at all. Another major point is the relatively small share of exports 
and imports, as also shown on a comparative basis in Table 1. The 
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74 raised Japan's import bill sig­
nificantly which were paid for by an increase in exports. Even so, 
Japan remains more of a domestically-oriented economy than any European 
nation. The substantial increase of Japan's share in world markets 
(see Table 1) has been predominantly a reflection of its overall GNP 
growth. Export demand, very important for some firms and industries, 
has taken about one-third of total manufacturing production. For the 
economy as a whole, almost 90 percent of Japanese production of goods and 
services has been for the home market. 
Distribution of Production and Workers 
Striking changes have occurred in the sectoral composition 
of production and accordingly in the allocation of the labor force, 
as shown in Table 3. Two major sets of forces were at work, on the 
demand side and on the supply side. As people's incomes rose, their 
spending patterns evolved from foodstuffs to light consumer goods to 
durable consumer goods and to a variety of services--leisure, education, . 
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health, finance, and the like. Concomitantly, the integration of local 
into mass, national markets proceeded apace. Economies of scale brought 
mass production of consumer durables; mass media, especially television, 
diffused information and homogenized tastes; higher educational 
levels expanded awareness; improved transportation lovered costs of 
reaching markets. 
This changing structure of demand brought about, in Japan's private 
market economy, changes in production in response, both directly 
and for the needed additions of machinery and other intermediate 
goods. At the same time wage rates and other production costs 
were rising, so certain products could no longer be produced at 
comp~titive prices. For example, in manufacturing Japan's comparative 
advantage in the 1950s lay in the production of textiles and other light 
consumer goods in which labor-intensive methods were efficient. By the 
late 1970s labor was no longer so abundant and certainly not cheap; 
comparative advantage had shifted away from simple labor-intensive goods 
to industries utilizing higher technologies, more skilled labor, 
and more capital, such as automobiles, consumer electronics, and 
steel. 
This transformation has been nowhere more apparent than in agri­
culture. While technically very efficient, agricultural production 
has become more and more economically inefficient because of high labor 
costs and minute farm size,still averaging less than three acres. As 
Table 3 indicates, agriculture now constitutes a small share of total 
domestic output, and a modest share of the labor force. The flow of 
workers out of agriculture into higher paying industrial and service 
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jobs has been immense, including virtually all young people. One of 
the advantages of being a relatively small, populus country is that many 
rural workers commute to urban jobs; as a result most rural families now 
derive the majority of their income· from non-farm work. Even so, the 
growth of the rest of the economy has been so rapid that the remaining 
farm workers continue to be relatively inefficient. To enable them to 
share in the benefits of industrial growth, and to obtain their votes, 
the government has since the late 1950's increasingly subsidized selected 
agricultural products, particularly rice, beef and citrus fruits, through 
high prices and severe import restrictions. The costs of this income 
transfer have been borne by consumers and taxpayers. 
'.The growth and changing composition of production has brought 
about major shifts in population and labor force. Industry and many 
services tend to concentrate in,and at times create, urban areas. As of 
1975, three-quarters of Japan's people live in cities, one-quarter in the 
seventeen cities with populations over 500,000. About half the labor 
force and 55 percent of net domestic production were in the three major 
metropolitan areas sprawled along the Pacific Coast side of the main 
island Honshu: Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama, Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe, and Nagoya. 
Japan has become an urban economy and society, with many of the positive 
and negative agglomeration effects of large cities everywhere. 
Industrial Organization 
Industrialization and urba,., concentration do not necessarily 
imply productjon concentration in Liant companies. Indeed one of the 
persistent features of the Japanese economy has been the continued 
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importance of relatively small units of production. As of 1977, virtually 
all workers in agriculture, and four-fifths in construction, wholesall! 
and retail trade, and personal services, and 55 percent of the workers 
in manufacturing were still in enterprises of less than 100 workers. 
As of 1975, in the corporate enterprise sector of manufacturing there 
were 857 companies with more than 1000 employees; they produced 46.1 
percent of the sector's gross value added and employed 36.8 percent of 
its labor force (but less than a quarter of the total labor force in 
manufacturing due to the importance of unincorporated small producers) . 
.Just as substantial differences in labor productivity have persicted 
among the se~tors of the economy, with agriculture least productive a~d 
retail and wholesale trade next so, so too have large productivity 
differentials persisted within sector by size of firm, even though they narrowed 
considerably over the period. Thus, in 1975 , as com;rnred with 
large manufacturing companies (with 1000 plus employees), the average 
worker in firms with 50 to 99 employees produced only 63 percent 
(in value added) as much, had only 34 percent as much capital (tangible fixed 
assets) to work with, and received wages only 64 percent as high. These 
differentials narrow regularly as firm size increases. This pattern and 
degree of productivity gap cr,ntinued on averagE to be substantially greater 
in Japan than the United States, though newly industrializing nations 
appear to have a similar industrial structure. The causes and persistence 
of this pattern of economic dualism are historical, deep'-rooted, and 
complex. They have reflected greater access by large firms to borrowed 
funds at lower costs, higher technological levels and ability to engar.e 
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in technological innovation, better educated and selected workers who 
subsequently receive more company-specific training, membership of worb:rs 
in_ enterprise unions, and hiring, promotion, and wage practices of life­
time employment and seniority-based promotion. 
In Japan as elsewhere large businesses have substantial economic 
and political power. In terms of degree of oligopoly, measured by the r.iarket 
share of the largest four or other small number of firms in any given 
industry Japan_displays a pattern very similar to other countries. Con­
centration occurs in essentially the srune industries for reasons of 
economies of large-scale production and organization, and the overall 
levels of concentration are about the same. Postwar mergers have 
somewhat offset Occupation anti-trust actions in specific industries. 
On the other hand rapid growth, entrance of new firms, and high competition 
among large firms for market share have tended to offset tendencies 
toward increased concentration and substantial oligopoly profits. While over 
the past two decades in Japan as elsewhere there has probably been a 
modest increase in the degree of concentration of economic power 
domestically, firms also face greater competitiveness from foreign firms 
in home as well as world markets. 
One feature of Japan's postwar economic history has been the re­
emergence of more or less loosely-knit groups of large industrial companies, 
analogous to conglomerates in Western countries but without centralized 
ownership and/or control • The most cohesive of these new keiretsu groups 
are descendents of the major prewar Zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and 
Sumitomo; however, family control was eliminated in the Occupation and 
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atockholding continues to be widely dispersed, though group member firms own 
in total up to one-third of each other's shares. Other groups, substantially 
less well integrated, have formed around several major bm!l~s or industrial 
companies. The additional power and economic contribution of such companies 
t:hrough membership in groups have probably not b12:cn great, though this 
remains a somewhat controversial issue difficult to evaluate objectively 
and empirically. 
IV. A Conducive Environment for Economic Growth 
The success of any single firm and indeed all partici,).:.nts in the economy 
depends not only upon their own behavior and actions but on the soci~l nnd 
political as well as economic environment within which they operate, 
domestically and internationally. Here we can only touc-.lt upon a nm:1bt: r 
of topics considered in more detail elsewhere. While ccr tain specific 
features have changed and others remained rel2tively cmH:;tant throughcut 
the period, on the whole the environment within which Ja.p<1n 's economy has 
opel:ated domestically and internationally has been very beneficial to and 
supportive of sustained rapid economic growth. 
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Major Continuities 
One of the great continuities has been political stability under a 
government strongly committed to a market-oriented, private enterprise 
economic system, as much for pragmatic as ideological reasons: the 
system worked, and worked very well. This has resulted in a basic continuity 
in policy and in the policy formulation process. It has nonetheless been 
an activist government, unwilling to leave everything to the equilibrating 
"invisible hand" of the marketplace, yet using rather than replacing it. Leading 
this policy process has been an able, elite, career central government· 
bureaucracy confident of its capabilities and ability to define the national 
interest (though often through the parochial perspectives of each 
Ministry). 
Another great continuity has been the persistence of labor peace, 
reflected in the absence of sustained strikes, job actions, absenteeism 
or industrial sabatoge. Much has to do with rapid growth itself which 
made it desirable for firms to hire and retain workers, but also with the 
systems of enterprise unionism, lifetime employment, sharing of burgeoning 
profits through substantial wage increases and semi-annual bonuses, and 
other institutional arrangements and managerial practices that have pro­
vided incentives for both white-collar and blue-collar workers to identify 
their interests with those of their employer. 
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Despite profound changes in the international arena certain major 
continuities persisted. One was the most rapid sustained period of growth 
the world economy has ever enjoyed, and the even more rapid growth of world 
trade and capital flows. Japan benefitted from a liberal international 
economic order. in which trade barriers have continued to be reduced, trans­
portation and communications have improved while costs declined, and 
foreign technology has generally been available to those with the means to 
purchase it and capacity to absorb it. Japan's foreign policy, in which 
economics was certainly the most immediate concern, was founded through-
out the period on a broad economic, political, and military security 
alliance with the United States. Initially a patron-client relationship 
within which Japan depended upon the United States to champion its re-entry 
into the major international organizations, as Japan's economic strentth 
multiplied the alliance was gradually transformed into a partnership of 
increasingly deep importance to the United States and continuing indis­
pensability to Japan. 
One consequence of the devastating defeat of World War II and tl:e 
urgent needs for economic reconstruction was the development of a wide­
spread concensus among virtually elements of Japanese polity and society 
that priority should be given to restoring and raising the standard of 
living. It was obvious that this could only be accomplished through 
growth of economic output. Most, certainly those in power, shared 
the belief that this could best be achieved by private business but with 
the help of government •. Moreover, attainment of rapid growth seemed to 
solve all problems at once. It enabled consumption levels to rise, 
made increasing resources available for investment for future growth, 
Postwar Economic History - 22 
created jobs and increasingly good ones, provided the exports to pay for 
imports,enhanced Japan's status in the eyes of the world, and enabled po­
liticians to provide benefits to important interest groups-farmers and 
small businessmen as well as big business. However, this virtually single­
minded focus on GHP growth which persisted into the late 1960s ignored 
the increasingly costly byproducts of the industrial process: urban con-
gestion,increasing pollution, environmental degradation, specific 
tragedies such as the Minamata mercury poisoning, the lagging provision 
of public services and amenities (parks, water, sewage systems) and of 
housing, and what has been termed the "uglification" of cities, national 
scenic spots, and resort sites~ Accordingly the growth concensus and 
govefllment pro-business policies weakened, and during the 1970s "quality 
of life" issues becam~ somewhat more important. 
The Govermr.ent 's Role 
One of the most controversial issues in Japan's postwar economic 
history is the appraisal of the contribution cf gcverD.&~ent policy 
growth process. The government sector itself remained a rela-
tively small claimant on national production. The policy decision to 
limit defense expenditures to only 1 percent of GNP has been only part 
of the explanation. Others have included the delay in provision of public 
amenities.and in social welfare programs until the mid-1970s. Similarly 
it is generally accepted that the government's macro planning, in five, 
seven, or ten year plans, was indicative only; its main effectshave 
_been on government investment expenditures and in helping shape optimistic 
expectations for future economic prospects. Actual performance sub­
stantially exceeded the growth targets of each plan between 1956-71, 
but persistently failed to achieve the targets of the 1970s because of 
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the severity and duration of the 1974-5 recession. 
Throughout the period, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
government used a wide combination of incentives and controls to encourage 
and channel investment into high priority growth sectors. These included 
import restrictions which long protected domestic markets for Japanese 
producers, accelerated depreciation and other fiscal incentives, low­
interest rate loans through government financial institutions, licensing 
of foreign technology contracts, and "administrative guidance" to influ­
ence business investment and production decisions. Government ministries 
have obstrusively kept in virtually daily contact with big business and required 
immense amounts of information. In general the degree 
of gQvernment control over the economy has been reduced, particularly as 
foreign trade restrictions have been greatly liberalized to Western levels. 
Certainly the government did much to create an environment that has 
been pro-business in Japan. This has not been unique since similar rela­
tionships exist in European countries, yet the atmosphere has been differ­
ent from the antagonistic government-business relationship often seen as 
prevailing in the United States. Nonetheless, the relationshi;,s among big 
business, the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party politicians, and the 
central government bureaucratic elite has been close and in many respects 
symbiotic. Business finances politics, the political leadership controls 
the bureaucracy but relies upon it for policy and legislative initiative, 
retiring senior bureaucrats are hired by business or become. politicians. 
Yet this triumvirate cannot control all policies in what is, after all, 
an electoral, parliamentary democracy. The power of other interest groups, 
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especially farmers and small businessmen, is reflected in policies for 
their specific benefit to the cost of others, especially consumers. 
One controversial issue is whether the predominant source of the 
impetus to growth has lain with the -government, sometimes referred to 
in its extreme form as the "Japan, Inc." view of government-business 
relations, or with private business entrepreneurial and managerial 
initiative and leadership. A related issue is that of the effective­
ness of the government's industrial policy, handled mainly by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (HITI). 
Proponents of the government's leading role argue that government 
policy has rationally selected and promoted the new industries of the 
futu~e, while aiding the transfer of labor and capital out of declining 
industries. Skeptjcs argue that government support was quite indiscrim­
inate in helping all industries and that the evolution of the industrial 
structure was due primarily to ordinary private market forces. They 
point to certain mistakes in the choice of industries selected for 
promotion such as aircraft or the processing of non-ferrous minerals such 
as aluminum, and to the prolonged, increasingly ·expensive subsidization 
of certain inefficient sectors, especially agriculture, coal mining, and 
small-scale wholesale and retail trade. In Japan as in other democracies 
the government is not monolithic and policies are not always well coordinated; 
no simple evaluation of the government's role in the economy is valid. (Hy 
judgment is that the government's role has been positive but often exaggerated.) 
The First Phase of Growth 
Few in the 19503 anticipated Japan's economic success. The government's 1958-
62 plan projecting a 6.5 percent growth rate seemed overly optimistic. The 
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inability to earn or borrow sufficient dollars to pay for needed imports 
(the balance of payments problem) was correctly perceived as the dominant 
constraint upon growth. Japan was allowed to behave like other 
developing nations in imposing severe restrictions on imports and foreign 
exchange and capital flows for balance of payments reasons, and generally 
to behave as if its actions had little impact on the rest of the world. 
As the economy moved beyond postwar recovery business optimism began 
to emerge. Actual performance exceeded expectations, and the investment 
boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s fed upon itself. The annual 
average growth of GNP accelerated, despite occasional mild slowdowns, 
from 7.1 percent between 1952-57 to 9.8 percent between 1957-62, and to 
10.3 percent for each of the subsequent two five-year periods. Prime 
Minister Ikeda's 1960 ten-year income doubling plan electrified the 
popular imagination; in actuality the economy did far better, doubling in 
seven years. By the mid-1960s Japan had bccane a prosperous industrial 
nation with excellent growth prospects; business optimism blossomed. 
Private demand--investrucnt, consumption, and export--flourished, and 
monetary-fiscal policy most of the time was directed toward mildly 
restraining the ebullient economy rather than stimulating it. The 
recessions of 1957-58, 1962, and 1965 were only slowdowns, not declines, 
in the growth rate (see Figure 1) and were quickly overcome in a new 
surge of growth. 
Major Turning Points 
By the late 1960s sustained economic success had transformed the 
economy profoundly. Japan was well established as a member of the 
advanced industrial nations. Private consumption was comfortable, add 
rising for virtually all Japanese. At the same time its very size and 
its pattern of growth had brought the economy to three major turning 
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points. First, it became widely recognized that the growth pattern was 
undesirably unbalanced,single-mindedly pursuing GNP while ignoring its 
costly byproducts and the quality of life generally. Second, highly 
successful export performance by the manufacturing sector had come to 
eliminate the balance of payments constraint, despite ever-rising imports 
of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs as the growth rate increased 
and import barriers were gradually reduced. Third, the economy had 
become so large that despite its relatively modest foreign trade sector 
by domestic quantitative criteria, its impact on the rest of the world, 
particularly the powerful United States and European nations,was too 
great not to expect feedbacks and on occasion retaliation; Japan could 
no longer act as if it were an isolated small country. 
The combination of these three turning points did much to shape Japan's 
economic policies and performance in the 1970s. To these forces were 
added three more in 1973-74: the oil crisis; intolerably rapid infla­
tion; and the most serious worldwide and domestic recession and stag-
flat ion of the postwar period. Japanese suddenly became aeutely aware of 
their interdependence with the world economy and their vulnerability to 
interruption of essential natural resource imports, notably oil but also 
foodgrains. The world economic environment was no longer so stable and 
benign. Economic circumstances had rather suddenly become much more 
complex than a decade earlier. 
As already noted, unbalanced growth had resulted in intolerably 
high levels of industrial pollution and urban congestion, and insufficient 
attention to housing, social amenities, and problems of the aged. In­
creasing public concern resulted in some reshaping of governmental priorities 
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with greater allocation of public and mandated private resources to 
improving the quality of life, even at some cost in the GNP growth 
rate. Similarly, as the balance of payments constraint was eliminated, 
domestic constraints on the growth process became more important: 
control of inflation; some (exaggerated) concern about increasing 
scarcity of labor; the narrowing of the technology gap; and following 
the 1974-5 recession excess productive capacity, a sharp decline in 
optimistic business expectations and consumer confidence, lowered 
business investment rates, and inadequate private domestic demand to 
restore the economy to its full growth potential. 
In the 1970s Japan's balance of payments, no longer inhibiting 
econol)ri.c growth, instead became the locus of two periods of economic ten­
sion with the Unitetl States an<l Western Europe. The now large 
as well as rapid expansion of Japanese competitive exports, while benefitting 
Western consumers, adversely affected producers in certain industries. 
In 1971-72 and again in 1977-78 Japan's exports far outstripped imports 
and the current account of the balance of payments went into 
surplus intolerably large to the United States and Europe. Both 
occurred in periods of considerable difficulty and tension in the world 
economy. In 1971 the prolonged United States deficit prompted policy 
steps which brought to an end the Bretton Woods system of fixed foreign 
exchange rates, and resulted from February 1973 in the floating exchange 
rate system in which the yen appreciated sharply from its previously 
fixed rate. In 1977-78 Japanese export competitiveness again affected 
a number of politically powerful industries in Western nations. The American balanc 
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of payments was in large deficit, the OPEC oil nations continued to run 
trade surpluses and in 1979 to raise prices even further,. !ind the in­
dustrial world economy had still not recovered fully from the 1974 
recession. 
Thus the 1970s have been a rather troubled period for the Japanese 
economy. The domestic and international environments have become more 
complex and less supportive of growth. The oil crisis,quadrupling of 
oil prices, and continuing fears of oil shortages have had a profound 
psychological impact on Japanese public and private leaders. The econo-
my endured its worst recession of the postwar period, The growth rate, 
greatly affected by the recession, slo-wed sharply to a 4. 7 percent rate 
between 1972--78. The government had to engage in increasingly massive 
deficit spending between 1976-1979 to generate sufficient domestic demand for 
the economy to recover and grow. It appears that the annual growth 
potential of the economy, about 10 percent in the 1960s, had made a 
downward transition to about 6-7 percent by the end of the 1970s. 
Nonetheless, the funda1Pental lessons of the 1970s are positive. 
The economy, in facing adversity and vulnerability, has demonstrated 
it is resiliant, flexible and strong, not weak. It was highly 
effective in ending the inflation surge of the mid-1970s. Its recession
in absolute terms was considerably less severe than in other industrial nations. 
The quadrupled cost of oil imports, which provide three-quarters of Japan's 
primary energy consumption, was relatively quickly paid for by export 
expansion; if anything the economy tended to overshoot in foreign trade 
while lagging in domestic adjustment. 
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Indeed these adjustments have made the longer-run transition problems 
from superfast to merely rapid growth less difficult than might have 
otherwise been the case. In particular potential difficulties in labor­
management relations have been averted, and cost-push inflationary wage 
increases avoided. Even at 6 percent, Japan's growth rate during the 
1970s and projected for the 1980s is more rapid than any other major 
industrial nation. And 6 percent growth in Japan's trillion dollar economy 
is much larger absolutely than the 10 percent increases in the smaller economy of 
the 1960s. 
V. The Benefits and Costs of Successful Growth 
'Japan's approach to its economy is by no means a panacea, and the 
results by no means a utopia. In historical perspective, it is incon­
trovertible that the material economic conditions of almost all Japanese 
have risen immensely in the quarter-century following the end of the Allied 
Occupation. Inbalances and problem areas remain, but the quality of life of 
the average Japanese has improved significantly. 
Given the complexity of human life, no single welfare index is appro­
priate. The average standard of living{private consumption per person 
adjusted for price changes) rose by about 5.4 times between 1952 and 1978• 
.Health care improved substantially. Infant mortality declined, tubercu­
losis was virtually eliminated as a major killer,and male and female 
life expectancy has become the highest in the world. Despite high food 
prices, the quality and diversity of the Japanese diet has increased 
substantially. Increases in discretionary income, the mass diffusion of 
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consumer durables, and urban living have dramatically altered Jpanese 
lifestyles. 
While housing and provision of most public amenities and services have 
improved absolutely, demand for them has grown considerably more rapidly, especially 
in congested large cities of which Tokyo is the most extreme case. The 
dream of most Japanese to own their own house eventually is not fully 
congruent with the realities of urban living; city buildings 
still remain of low average height as many people apparently continue 
to prefer to commute long distances rather than dwelling in high-rise 
apartments. Since land prices are extremely high the urban landscape is 
changin~ of course. Much urban rental housing is subsidized by companies 
for t~eir workers, and by the government. 
However, in some dimensions industrialization and affluence has 
created absolutely worsened conditions on a broad scale, even aside 
from specific locational industry-related tragedies such as the Minamata 
mercury poisoning, respiratory diseases of Yokkaichi and similar industrial 
complexes, or cadmium poisoning cases. By the early 1970s pollution-­
noise, water, and especially air--was both widespread and at high levels. 
Subsequent strict pollution-control regulations over industrial and 
automobile emissions have reduced air pollution levels substantially, 
according to the OECD to levels less severe than in other industrial 
nations. Pollution and related environmental problems remain far from 
resolved nonetheless. 
Japanese cities, dynamic and exciting, are not beautiful. Massive 
modern buildings tower over traditionally serene temples, shrines, and 
parks. Family gardens have been paved over to provide parking for a 
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car, or built upon to provide separate housing for married children. 
Streets are narrow,spacious boulevards virtually non-existant; land 
devoted to roads or parks is far less in Japanese than in major 
Western cities. While public transportation facilities are excellent 
and relied upon predominately, all modes of urban transportation are 
heavily congested. As cities have grown commuting times for workers 
have lengthened. Tokyo, as in many other respects, is most extreme; 
more than one-fifth of Tokyo's workers commute for more than one hour 
one way to and from work. Even so Japanese cities are safe, crime-free, 
and fun to live in. 
Improvements in average levels of GNP or consumption per capita say 
litt~e about how rhe benefits of growth are distributed. While Japan 
11. by no means a completely egalitarian society, its distribution of 
income is among the most equal of the industrial nations, comparable to 
Sweden and substantially more so than the United States or France. 
Some groups remain relatively less well off: female employees and workers 
in small firms, the aged, the Korean and burakumin minorities. Howeveri, 
the lot of the disadvantaged has greatly improved both relatively and 
absolutely. Wage differentials of virtually all types have narrowed 
over time: by age, sex, education level, occupation, region. Farm 
families, historically among the poorest in Japan, now have incomes 
higher than urban families, though more family members work. Japan's 
affluence is mass-based; pockets of real poverty are few. Of course 
most Japanese, like most Americans or Europeans, do not perceive of 
themselves as particularly well off economically even though almost 
90 percent consider themselves middle-class. 
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In Japan as elsewhere the distribution of wealth is considerably less 
equal than income. High savings rates by almost all Japanese families 
mean that all have some assets, though inflation has eroded the value 
of savings deposits. The main wealth beneficiaries of Japan's postwar 
growth performance have been owners of land, especially in or near urban 
areas, and of successful businesses. Between 1952 and 1978 the price of 
urban land went up 72 times, GNP in current prices increased 33 times, 
average money wages rose by 16 times, and the Tokyo stock price index 
increased 17 times. 
Comparisons of Japan's level of living by the late 1970s with those 
of other industrial nations is difficult. Constnnption patterns differ 
and p~ices of goods and services vary, with housing particularly expen­
sive. Foreign exchange rate calculations provide only rough approximations, 
especially in the case of Japan where goods and services produced for 
home markets have become considerably more expensive than exports and 
imports relative to other countries. A Japan-United States comparison 
of purchasing power shows that per capita consumption in Japan, only 
19 percent of the American level in 1952, had reached 54 percent of the 
doubled American consumption level by 1978. The higher Japan-United 
States GNP per capita ratio for 1978 of 87 percent (on the exchange 
rate conversion basis) reflects Japan's greater proportion of 
investment and higher prices of domestic goods. 
A widespread Japanese view is that, after a century of trying, Japan 
has now essentially "caught up with the West" in socio-economic and 
The data in Table 4 as well as Table 1 support· technological terms. 
I 
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this perception. To many foreigners Japan does indeed appear an affluent, 
expensive, crime-free, rather polluted, mediocrely housed, congested 
nation of happy, industrious people who face problems common to those 
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Figure l; Basic Data • Annual Rates of Change 
Calendar err Unemployment
Real GNP Ratio
(1) (2) (3) 
1953 5.7 6.5 1.9
54 6.1 6.5 1.6
55 9.1 -1.1 2.5
56 8.0 0.3 2.3
57 8.0 3.1 1.9
58 5.4 -o. 4 : 2.1
59 9.2 1.0 1.7 
1960 14.1 3.6 1.4
61 15.6 5.3 1.3
62 6.4 6.8 1.3
63 10.6 7.4 1.1
64 13.3 3.9 1.2
65 4.5 6.6 1.2
66 10.9 5.1 1.3
67 12.5 4.0 1.3
68 14.0 5.3 1.2
69 12.2 5.2 1.1 
1970 11.8 7.7 1.2
71 5.2 6.1 1.2
72 9.5 4.5 1.4
73 10.0 11. 7 1.3
74 -0.5 24.5 1.4
75 1.4 11.8 1.9
76 6.5 9.3 2.0
77 5.4 8.0 2.0
78 5.6 3.8 2.2 
Sources: (1) Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on
National Inco~c Statistics 1951-57, pp. 82-83;
Annual Report on National Accotn1ts 1979, pp. 8-9. 
(2) Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual 1978. 
(3) Ministry of Labor, White Paper on Lahor, various
issues. 
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Table 1 
Comparisons of Economic Performance, 
aJapan and Major Western Countries 
United West United 
Iteni Japan States Germany Kingdom France Italy 
(1) Population (millions) 
1952 85.5 157.0 48.5 50.4 42.5 47.4 
1978 114.9 218.5 61.3 55_9f 53.3 56.7 
(2) Gross national product 
(billions of current dollars) 
1952 16.3 · 348.2 31.9 44.3 40.4 17.1 
1978 963.5 2,094.4 634.4 307.1 466.7 236.0 
(3) Gross national product per 
capita (current dollars) 
1952 188 2,181 643 870 947 359 
1978 8,386 9,588 10,349 5,494. 8,756 4,162 
(4) Gross domestic investment as 
percent of gross national prod. 
195Z 27.2 17.1 22.8 10.6 18.9 19.5 
1977 30.0 15.0 20.9 18.0 22.6 19.8 
(5) Government current expenditure 
as percent of gross national prod. 
1952 10.9 20.1 16.2 19.1 15.9 12.1 
1977 22.3 32.6 41.3 41.58 40.4 42.5 
(6) Exports and importsb as percent 
of gross national product 
1952 26.6 9.0 31.5 45.1 29.8 25.0 
1978 25.8 17.5 52.8 60.9 40.6 48.4 
(7) Share of world trade (percent) 
1952 2.2 17.1 5.2 5.4 2.5 
1978 7.4 13.5 10.7 6.7 4.7 
(8) Percent of labor force in 
agriculture 
Early 1950sc 41.7 12.2 23.2 5.1 . 27.7 32.8 
1977 11.6 3.6 6.4 2.5g 9.6h 14.6 
(9) Average annual rate of price 
change (percent)d 
1953-62: Wholesale price index -0.1 0.9 o.1e 3.4 0.2 
Consumer price index 2.8 1.3 3.0 4.1 2.4 
1963-72: Wholesale price index 1.3 2.6 1.6 3.7 3.2 2.7 
Consumer price index 5.2 3.5 3.3 5.2 4.3 3.9 
1973-78: Wholesale price index 7.1 9.2 5.1 18.1 12.6 19.0 
Consumer price index 11.3 8.0 5.1 16.1 13.7 16.4 
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Table 1: Sources and Notes 
Sources: Patrick and Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy 
Works (pp. 4-5); OECD, Main Economic Indicators, April 1979; OECD 
Observor, 1979; International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, May 1979; Internation.:;u. Labor Organization, Year Book of 
Labor Statistics, 1978; UN Demographic Yearbook, 1954. ---
Notes: 
a. It should be noted that not all economic indicators are internationally 
comparable; for example, the United States classifies as government 
current expenditures certain items included in gross domestic investment 
by other nations. 
b. Exports and imports of goods and services. 
c. Data are for 1950 for the United States and West Germany, 1951 for 
the United Kingdom and Italy, 1954 for France, and 1955 for Japan.
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Table 2 
Amount and Composition of Gross Notional Expenditures, 
1952. 1966, 1978 (in billion cun -":: price dc,llars, and percent) 
1952 1966 1978
Amount Amount % Amount % 
Consumption 12.6 72 .4 65.7 64.8 659.1 67.0
Private 10.7 61. 7 56.5 55.7 565.4 57.5
Government current expenditures 1.9 10.7 9.2 9.1 93.7 9.5 
Gross Domestic Investment 4.6 26.6 34.4 33.9 307.1 31.2
Private 3.4 19.1 24.4 24.0 205.0 20.8
Business fixed investment 2.0 11.5 16.2 16.0 133.6 13.6
Housing 0.5 2.6 5.8 5.7 68.1 6.9
Inventory accumulation 0.9 5.0 2.4 2.3 3.3 0.3
Government sector 1.3 7.5 10.0 9.9 102.1 10.4
Fixed investment 1.1 6.3 9.5 9.4 . 98.3 10.0
Inventory accumulation 0.2 1.2 0.5 0.5 3.8 0.4 
Net Foreign Trade Balance 0.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 17.4 1.8
Exports of goods and services 2.2 12 .6 11.6 11.4 114.8 11.7
Imports of goods and services -2.0 -11.5 -10.2 -10.0 -97.4 -9.9 
Cross National Expenditures (•GNP) 17.2 (100.0) 101.5 (100) 983.5 (100) 
Note: Amounts in dollars are converted at the averaf;c prevailing exchange rate of
¥ 360/dollar in 1952 and 1966, and¥ 209.7/dcllar in 1978. 
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on National Income Statistics, 1951-
1967 (1969); Economic Planning Agency, Japanese Economic Indicators, March 1979. 
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Table 3 
Gross Domestic Product at Current Market Prices and Labor Force, 



















1956 1977 Growth Rate (56-77) 
(%) 
Labor Labor Labor 
GDP Force GDP Force Output Force 
17.4 41.9 4.9 12.3 a:3 -4.3 
12.5 39.3 11.1 -4.5 
3.2 1.0 0.3 -3.8 
1.7 1.6 0.9 -1.4 
34.5 23. 9 36.8 34.8 15.4 3.3 
2.2 1.5 0.5 0.2 7.3 -7.1 
27.8 17.7 28.2 25. 7 15.1 3.3 
4.5 4.7 8.1 8.9 18.3 4.6 
48.1 34.1 58. 3 52.9 16.1 3.6 
2.1 0.7 2.3 0.7 15.5 1.0 
16.5 13.7 15.7 21.7 14.7 3.6 
8.5 4.6 6.4 6.4 13.5 3,0 
3.8 4.8 2.8 16.4 71.7 5.23.8 } 9.4 0. 7 20.0 J
9.8 10.7 11.0 17.1 15.6 3.7 
3.7 2.7 8.6 3.5 19.8 2.7 
Sources: GDP - Economic Planning Agency Annual Report on National Income St2tiGtics 
1972. (pp. 282-283). 
Economic Planning Agency Annual Report on National Accounts 
1977 (pp. 160-161). 
Labor Force - Office of the Prime Minister, Employment Survey 1956 (p. 26), 
1977 (pp. 30-31). 
Note: Since output is measured in nominal (current price) terms without adjustment 
for the effects of inflation, its growth rate is substantially greater than 
that of real output. 
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Table 4 
Socio-Economic Welfare Indicators, Japan and Major Western Cotmtries 
United United West
Japan States Kingdom Germany France Italy Sweden
• 
Infant Mortality Ratea 
1976 9.3 15.l ·14.0 17.4 10.4 19.1 8.3
Life Expectancy at Birth
1976 Male 72.2 68.7c 67.8g 68.0 69.0d
d 69.0£ 72 .1
Female 77.4 76.5c 73.8g 74.5 76.9 74.9£ 77.7
Population per Physician
1975 898 622 559d 516 678e 502f 615d 
Animal Protein. 
grams per inhabitant per day
1976 35 72 55 65 73 51 71
Full Time School Enrollment
age 15-19 % of age group
1977 70.9 72.0c 44.6c 41.5 54.6 40.Bc 56.3b 
Dweilin~ Completed
per 1,000 inhabitants
1977 15.2 6.1 5.9 6.3 10.0 3.2 6.7 
Population per car
1976 3.9 1.6 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.2 2.7
Energy Consumption
per capita
(tons of oil equivalent) 3.08 8.30 3.78 4.25 3.36 2.46 6.09 
Telephones
per 1,000 inhabitants
1976 426 721 394 344 293 271 689 
Newspaper Circulation
per 1,000 persons
1975 526d 287 388 312 214 113 572 
Television Set
per 1,000 inhabitants
1975 235 571d 320 306 268 213d 352 
Divorce Rate
per 1,000 pop.
1976 1.11 5.02 2.56 2.67 1.27c 0.18 2.64 
Sources: OECD, Observer, No. 97, 1979.
United Nations, Statistical Year Book, 1977.
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1977. 
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